

RUSSIA'S AGRARIAN PROBLEM

by

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INTRODUCTION

WHEN the Soviet government came to power in Russia in November 1917, it assumed the administration of a country predominantly agricultural, which had suffered a severe economic breakdown as a result of the World War, and whose industry, agriculture and transport were in consequence in a state of disorganization bordering on chaos. Economic and political conditions alike appeared unfavorable to the establishment of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." The productivity of agriculture, which formed the occupation of nearly eighty per cent of the population, was low, and its methods antiquated. Industry, which furnished employment to only nine per cent of the population, was as yet little developed.¹ Support of the Soviet government at first came almost solely from the industrial workers, numerically in a minority, who looked to the new order for improvement of their economic condition. The peasants, who constituted an overwhelming majority of the population, were politically unawakened, and were primarily concerned with the preservation of their rights to the land they already possessed or had recently seized from the landlords. Abroad, the Soviet government was viewed with fear and distrust by capitalistic States, whose economic system it directly challenged.

The Soviet government undertook to transform Russia from an economically backward, predominantly agricultural country into a modern, predominantly industrial country by means of the rapid development of basic industries and the industrialization of agriculture. This transformation was expected to accomplish two distinct aims: first, to permit Russia to attain the economic level of capitalistic States, and thus avert the possibility, suggested by Soviet economists, that the country might eventually become little more than a colony of one or more of those States; and second, to establish a basis for collaboration by industrial workers and peasants, thus assuring the maintenance of the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

Lenin was of the opinion that this basic transformation could be successfully effected only under a system of "planned economy" which would enable the government to regulate the use of natural resources and means of production and to plan both production and distribution over a period of years. Beginning with 1920, when a plan for the electrification of the country was first elaborated, the Soviet government gave serious consideration to the possibility of establishing a system of "planned economy." The State Planning Commission (*Gosplan*),

1. In 1923 the total population of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was estimated at 154,800,000, of which 125,500,000 were classified as rural and 29,300,000 as urban; of the latter group 3,269,900 were employed in industry.

charged with the examination and correlation of data on this subject, prepared a preliminary draft for a Five-Year Plan intended to cover the period of 1927-1932. This draft, amended and corrected, served as the basis for the Five-Year Plan of national economy which was inaugurated on October 1, 1928 for a period of five years ending September 30, 1933. The plan contains detailed programs for the development of every branch of national economy—industry, agriculture, transportation, building, etc.—covering the five-year period. The figures forecast by the plan are in each instance to be checked annually by “control figures,” based on estimates of the actual results achieved during the year under consideration, and these “control figures” are in turn to serve as a basis in altering the forecasts of the plan for the following year.²

The conception of “planned economy” which is embodied in the Five-Year Plan is premised on the assumption that the government actually controls all the resources and means of production of the State, and is thus free to plan their further development and disposal without reference to the plans of individuals or other groups. This condition, however, does not as yet exist in Russia. In 1917 the Soviet government decreed the nationalization of all the resources and means of production of the country—industry, banking, shipping, transportation, land and trade—with a view to creating a unified “socialized” economy. Over ninety-five per cent of the land, however, was retained by individual peasants, and a certain amount of trade is still controlled by private traders. At the present time, then, Russia’s national economy falls into two distinct sectors: the “socialized” sector, which embraces industry, transportation, finance, foreign trade, such internal trade as is handled by the State and the co-operatives, and the land occupied by State and collective farms; and the “private” sector, which embraces private trade and individual peasant farms. The Soviet government expects, however, that the effect of the Five-Year Plan will be to expand the “socialized” sector at the expense and to the eventual exclusion of the “private” sector.

ESSENCE OF THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM

The fact that land after 1917 remained to a large extent in the hands of individual peasants who controlled the quantity and quality of agricultural production constitutes the essence of Russia’s agrarian problem. The rapid development of industry depends on the capacity and willingness of the peasants to furnish grain for industrial workers and raw material for the factories, as well as a surplus of grain which may be exported in exchange for imports of such goods as cannot yet be produced in Russia. Should agricultural production decline, or merely fail to increase, the progress of industry might be indefinitely delayed, with resulting danger to the economic and political foundations of Soviet rule. The Soviet government might conceivably have adopted either one of two methods to raise agricultural production: it might have encouraged production on small-scale individual peasant farms, or it might have expanded the “socialized” sector of agriculture by fostering the development of large-scale State and collective farms. The former method did not recommend itself to the government, which feared that it would serve to perpetuate the “private” sector, and to create a class of peasant “capitalists” intrinsically opposed to “socialization,” on whom the State would have to depend for foodstuffs and raw materials. The latter method was vigorously advocated by Lenin as alone conformable to the economic and political conceptions of a “socialized” State.

During the years immediately following the revolution, 1917-1921, the government was too preoccupied with the task of combating counter-revolution and intervention on the one hand, and obtaining grain from the peasants by means of requisition on the other, to devote any serious attention to plans for collectivization. The introduction in 1921 of the New Economic Policy, which represented a concession to the individualist instincts of the peasants, still further postponed the establishment of a collectivist system of agriculture. The period of economic rehabilitation, 1921-1927, witnessed the emergence of a group of prosperous individ-

2. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, *Piatiletii Plan Narodno-Khozyaystvennogo Stroitelstva S.S.S.R.* (The Five-Year Plan of the National Economic Construction of the Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics), Moscow, “Planned Economy,” 1929, 3 vols. For a brief summary of the Five-Year Plan in English, cf. *The Soviet Union Looks Ahead*, New York, Live-right, 1929.

ual peasants, the *kulaks*, who controlled agricultural production, with no corresponding development of the "socialized" sector, notwithstanding the encouragement given by the government to agricultural co-operation. In 1927 agricultural production was at so low a level as to threaten the further development of industry, and there seemed little hope of increasing it under a system of small-scale farming. Trotzky sought a solution of the agrarian crisis in intensive collectivization and the suppression of the *kulaks*. The Communist party, however, rejected this solution on the ground that the time was not yet ripe for extreme measures, and gave its approval to Stalin's agrarian program, which called for encouragement of agricultural co-operation, as a first step towards collectivization, and simultaneous limitation of the activities of the *kulaks*.

The inauguration in 1928 of the agricultural program of the Five-Year Plan, which made provision for expansion of State and collective farms over a period of five years and the improvement of agriculture on individual farms, coincided with repression of the *kulaks* by means of discriminatory legislation. The measures adopted by the government against the *kulaks* were criticized by the Right Opposition, which claimed that they threatened to reduce agricultural production and to create hostility on the part

of the peasants. The results, however, of the harvest of 1928-1929, the first year of the operation of the Five-Year Plan, revealed a development in the production of State and collective farms which, in the opinion of the government, made it possible to proceed with the suppression of the *kulaks* in the manner advocated by Trotzky in 1927.

DRIVE FOR COMPLETE COLLECTIVIZATION

In consequence, early in 1930, the government launched a drive for "complete collectivization" and the "liquidation" of the *kulaks*. The extreme measures adopted in various regions by the local authorities to carry this program into effect provoked opposition on the part not only of the *kulaks* against whom it was directed, but of other peasant groups as well. Aware that collectivization effected against the wishes of the peasants would produce negative, if not disastrous results, Stalin in March 1930 called a halt to collectivization, while at the same time declaring that the "liquidation" of the *kulaks* was to proceed with undiminished force. The expansion of the "socialized" sector of agriculture which has taken place this year has caused Soviet authorities to claim that in agriculture, as in industry, the "socialist" system has now definitely displaced the "capitalist" system.³

THE AGRARIAN QUESTION BEFORE THE REVOLUTION

Prior to 1861 land in Russia had been the property of the State, the Church, various government institutions, the nobility and the gentry. The Crown serfs were emancipated in 1866, when they received allotments of land from the State. By the Emancipation Edict of 1861 the household and peasant serfs of the nobility and gentry received personal freedom, without compensation to their former masters. The government, which opposed the creation of a landless peasant class, but was at the same time unwilling to deprive the landlords of their estates, effected a compromise with regard to the distribution of land among the liberated peasants. The household serfs received no land, and were forced either to seek employment in urban centres, or to hire themselves out as agricultural workers. The

peasant serfs acquired their homes at a nominal price: in addition, they were to receive the use of a certain amount of arable land corresponding, whenever possible, to the amount of land they had previously leased from the landlords, in return for payment in labor or money.

Whenever the landlords were willing to sell the land thus set aside for the use of the peasants, the latter were offered the aid of the government in effecting the purchase.

3. In the absence of other sources of information, the statistics used in the preparation of this report have been exclusively drawn from official publications of the Soviet government. The trustworthiness of agricultural statistics published by the Soviet government has occasionally been placed in doubt, not because of willful misrepresentation by the authorities, but primarily because of the difficulty of collecting accurate statistics in a country which shows a wide diversity of agricultural conditions in its various regions, when the data collected must be frequently based on the statements of ignorant and illiterate peasants. The incompleteness and possible inaccuracy of these statistics must therefore be borne in mind when reference is made to them. The figures given by estimates of the Five-Year Plan, however, must be placed in another

The government undertook to furnish four-fifths of the purchase price, provided the peasants furnished the other fifth, and then collected the sum advanced to the peasants in the form of redemption payments spread over a period of forty-nine years. The land so purchased, however, did not become the individual property of the peasants. It was turned over to the village community—*mir*—which was made collectively responsible for both redemption payments and taxes. The *mir* periodically re-distributed the land within its jurisdiction among its members, in accordance with the size of their families. Peasants who desired to separate themselves from the *mir* could do so only after discharging their share of the obligations of the *mir*. It was not until November 9, 1906 that the government, alarmed by the agrarian disturbances which had taken place during the revolution of 1905, passed a law which permitted the peasants to separate themselves from the *mir*, and to take personal possession of the land they had received at the last re-distribution, without compensation to the community. On the eve of the World War, one-third of the peasants in European Russia had separated themselves from the *mir*, and had received, or were about to receive, individual properties.

DISTRIBUTION OF LAND

The distribution of land effected under the terms of the Emancipation Edict proved unsatisfactory to the majority of the peasants. Except in the most fertile regions of the country, the peasants received smaller allotments of land than those they had leased from the landlords prior to 1861, and usually paid more for the land than it was worth. The *mir*, in an attempt to effect a just distribution of land among its members, introduced the "strip" system—i. e., assigned to every peasant strips of each kind of land at its disposal, instead of one compact lot of land. As a result, the peasants received

small strips of land, varying in number from ten to one hundred, situated at a considerable distance from each other, and found it impossible, under these conditions, to utilize to the best advantage what implements and draft-animals they possessed. The agrarian reform effected during the period 1906-1910 did not succeed in eliminating the "strip" system: the peasants who separated themselves from the *mir* were frequently obliged to take permanent possession of land which had last been distributed in strips.

The peasant class, before 1917, did not constitute an economically uniform group. The more enterprising or more fortunate peasants who succeeded in accumulating some capital during the years following emancipation, found it possible to purchase land other than that which had been assigned to the village communities by the edict of 1861. Title to land so purchased was vested in the peasants individually. These more prosperous peasants, by shrewd planning and contriving, frequently raised themselves to the position of agricultural capitalists: they were known as *kulaks* (big fist). At the other end of the scale were found the less enterprising or less fortunate peasants—the "poor" peasants—who lacked the means of production necessary to cultivate their small holdings, and gradually drifted into the ranks of the landless agricultural proletariat. Midway between the *kulaks* and the poor peasants stood the "middle" peasants who, although by no means prosperous, at least found it possible to make both ends meet. It must be pointed out, however, that the steady growth of the agricultural population during the period 1861-1917, tended to reduce the size of the holdings of each peasant family. Except for the small group of *kulaks*, the Russian peasants, whether classified as "poor" or "middle," suffered from "land-hunger" and were at the same time prevented by their poverty from obtaining the machinery, seeds and fertilizers which would have served to improve the productivity of the land they had. The peasants came to feel that they had been unjustly treated in 1861, and that the government should correct this injustice by furnishing them with land at the expense of the nobility and gentry.⁴

category. Judgment as to these estimates, whether they be considered feasible or impossible of fulfillment, must be suspended until completion of the period they are intended to cover.

The following table of weights and measures may serve to clarify the figures given in this report:

<i>Dessiatine</i>	=	1.0925	hectares
<i>Hectare</i>	=	2.471	acres
<i>Centner</i>	=	220.46	pounds
<i>Ruble</i>	=	51.48	cents

For reasons of space, consideration in this report has been given only to grain crops. It should be pointed out that other crops—cotton, sugar beets, oil seeds, etc.—occupy one-sixth of the sown area.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND THE LAND PROBLEM

The Provisional government, formed in March 1917, established the principle that land should be the property of those who cultivated it, but left the actual settlement of the land question to the Constituent Assembly.⁴ The Bolshevik party, which regarded the expropriation of the landlords as a measure necessary to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, promised the peasants in 1917 that, once in power, it would provide them with an adequate amount of land. By a decree of November 7 (October 26) 1917 the Soviet government nationalized the land. Private property in land was forever abolished. Henceforth, land was to be regarded as the property of the State, and could not be bought, sold or rented. Individuals, however, received the use of the land, which they could cultivate with their own labor or that of their families; the hiring of labor was prohibited.⁵

The nationalization of land remained largely a paper measure. The government did not actually obtain control of the land, except for some four million *dessiatines* on which it established State farms. In practice the peasants, who after the revolution of March 1917 had been convinced that they were at liberty to enlarge their holdings at the expense of the landlords, proceeded to seize the estates of the nobility, the gentry, and even the *kulaks*, and to parcel this land among themselves, later parceling it still further when their children married or moved away from the family homestead. As a result, land was transferred from the landlords not to the State, but to some one hundred and twenty million peasants, who regarded it, to all intents and purposes, as their own private property.⁷

4. For further discussion of the agrarian question during the pre-war period, cf. James Mavor, *An Economic History of Russia*, 2nd ed., London and Toronto, Dent & Sons, 1925, 2 vols.

5. The Constituent Assembly, several times postponed by the Provisional government, was finally convened on January 18, 1918, when the Soviet government was already in power, but was dispersed on the following day.

6. *Sobranie Uzakonenii i Rasporiazhenii Rabochavo i Krestianskavo Pravitelstva* (Collection of Laws and Regulations of the Workers' and Peasants' Government), 1917-1918, Vol. I, p. 3-5.

7. On the agrarian revolution, 1917-1918, cf. Communist Academy, *Agrarnaya Revoliutsia* (The Agrarian Revolution), Moscow, 1928, 4 vols., Vol. II, *Peasant Movement in 1917*. The extent to which land has been parceled since 1917 may be judged from the fact that, whereas prior to the war there were sixteen million farms in Russia, their number in 1929 was estimated at from twenty-five to twenty-seven million. Kallinin, President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Report at Fifth All-Union Congress of Soviets, *Izvestia* (News), June 1, 1929.

LENIN'S AGRARIAN PROGRAM

The "fractioning" of the land which took place in 1917-1918 was viewed by Lenin with apprehension. "If we sit, as of yore, on small holdings," he said, "though we be free citizens on free land, we are nevertheless threatened by inevitable destruction."⁸ Lenin feared that small-scale farms, left in the hands of peasants unacquainted with modern methods of agriculture, and generally too poor to purchase machinery, improved seeds and fertilizers, would fail to produce grain and raw materials in quantities sufficient to satisfy the needs of a growing population and an expanding industry. Politically, Lenin considered the small-scale farmer a menace to the principles on which the Soviet State was founded: he saw in him a potential capitalist, more concerned with the preservation of his property than with the welfare of the State as a whole. Moreover, in his opinion, the perpetuation of small-scale farming was detrimental to the peasants themselves who never would, under such conditions, be freed from poverty and ignorance.⁹

Lenin was convinced that the collective cultivation of land on large-scale farms offered the only way out of the economic *impasse* in which Russia had been left by the "imperialistic war."¹⁰ He expected that such farms, supplied by the State with agricultural experts and improved seeds, fertilizers and machinery, would furnish grain both for home consumption and for export, would make it possible for Russia to proceed unhampered with the development of her industries, and would eventually insure its economic independence. Simultaneously, he hoped that the industrialization of agriculture—the introduction of machinery and large-scale management on the farms—would serve to create an identity of interests between the peasants and the workers, would forge a "link" (*smychka*) between them, and would convert the peasants from capitalists in embryo into willing participants in the tasks undertaken by the Soviet government.

8. Lenin, V. I. *Sobranie Sochinenii* (Collected Works), Moscow, State Publishing Board, 1926-1930, Vol. XIV, Part I, p. 169.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

10. *Ibid.*, Vol. XVI, p. 375.

Lenin was careful to emphasize that the participation of the peasants in the collective movement must be voluntary to be successful. He firmly opposed collectivization "from above" by means of decrees, pressure by local authorities, or coercion. Collective farms, he held, could be permanently established only by peasants who had become convinced of the benefits of collectivization.¹¹ Lenin warned his followers that the transition from individual to collective farming could be effected only gradually, and that differences in the agricultural development of various regions of the country should always be taken into consideration.¹²

The natural ally of the working class in the villages, according to Lenin, was the "middle" peasant (*seredniak*), distinguished from the so-called rich peasant (*kulak*) by the fact that he lives by his own labor, and does not "exploit" the labor of others. The government, he maintained, leaning on the agricultural workers and the poor peasants, should set out to win the confidence of the "middle" peasants, and avoid all measures which might lead them to join forces with the *kulaks*.¹³

THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

The events of 1918-1920 prevented the realization of Lenin's agrarian program. The Soviet government, engaged in combating intervention and counter-revolution on several fronts, resorted to measures known as "war communism" in order to avert a threatened famine. Grain and other food-stuffs were requisitioned from the peasants at prices far below those which could be obtained in the open market, and drastic restrictions were at the same time placed on private trade. The peasants retaliated by restricting the sown area and finally, here and there, resorted to revolt. Confronted by an acute economic crisis, Lenin in 1921 introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP). This policy represented a concession, which was expected to be temporary, to the "petty bourgeois" and "petty capitalistic" instincts of peasants and private traders. The na-

tionalization of land remained in force. The peasants, however, were permitted to rent land, hire labor, and sell their grain to private traders, whose position, in turn, was considerably ameliorated.¹⁴

THE "PRIVATE" SECTOR: 1921-1927

The years of "war communism" had served to level to a certain extent within the "private" sector, the economic differences which had existed between the several groups of peasants before 1917. The rich peasants became poorer, while the poor peasants improved their economic condition. As a result of this readjustment, the ranks of the "middle" peasants were strengthened both from above and from below, and by 1920 the "middle" peasant was regarded by the Soviet authorities as the central figure in the village. The following two tables illustrate the economic differentiation which took place in the villages during the period 1917-1920:

OWNERSHIP OF DRAFT-ANIMALS¹⁵

	Percentage in 1917	Percentage in 1920
No draft animals	29.0	27.6
1 " "	49.2	63.6
2 " "	17.0	7.9
3 " "	3.4	0.7
4 " "	0.9	0.2
5 " " or more	0.5	none

SOWN AREA OF FARMS¹⁶

	Percentage in 1917	Percentage in 1920
No sown area	10.6	4.7
2 <i>dessiatines</i>	30.4	47.9
2 to 4 <i>dessiatines</i>	30.1	31.6
4 to 10 <i>dessiatines</i>	25.2	15.3
10 <i>dessiatines</i> or over	3.7	0.5

The introduction of the New Economic Policy, however, tended to alter this distribution economic forces. On the one hand, the rich peasants (*kulaks*) who had contrived to maintain a foothold during the years of revolution and "war communism" now found it possible to resume their activi-

14. For further discussion of the period of "war communism," cf. Maurice Dobb, *Russian Economic Development Since the Revolution*, New York, Dutton, 1928, Chapter IV. The conditions of land tenure were made still easier by legislation adopted in 1925.

15. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. *K Voprossu o Sozialisticheskome Pereoustroistve Selskovo Khozyastva* (Regarding the Question of the Reorganization of Agriculture), Materials prepared by the People's Commissariat for Workmen's and Peasants' Inspection of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Moscow, State Publishing Board, 1928, p. 7.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

11. *Ibid.*, Vol. XVI, p. 159, p. 392; Vol. XX, Part II, p. 320.

12. *Ibid.*, Vol. XVI, p. 106; Vol. XVIII, Part I, p. 143, p. 200.

13. *Ibid.*, Vol. XVI, p. 146; Vol. XX, p. 361.

ties. On the other hand, the poor peasants who had seized land in 1917 frequently did not possess the means to cultivate it and became dependent on their more prosperous neighbors. The rich peasants were eager to rent land and hire labor for its cultivation; they owned horses and agricultural implements, and produced a surplus of grain over and above their own needs. The poor peasants began to rent land to the *kulaks*, to hire themselves out as agricultural laborers, and to rent from the *kulaks* machinery and draft-animals for the cultivation of what land they retained. In addition, they frequently bought grain from the *kulaks*, in return for money or labor. Of the total land rented in 1925, 83.5 per cent belonged to poor peasants, 15 per cent to "middle" peasants, and 1.4 per cent to *kulaks*.¹⁷ The majority of poor peasants engaged in agricultural work on the farms of other peasants retained some parcel of land; 46.2 per cent of the total, however, were pure proletarians, in the sense that they no longer possessed any land.¹⁸

THE POSITION OF THE "KULAKS"

The gradual proletarianization of the lower groups of the village population was accompanied by a strengthening of the ranks of the *kulaks* and the more prosperous "middle" peasants. The Soviet government has at no time adopted a definite criterion to determine the particular point at which a peasant ceases to be a "middle" peasant and becomes a *kulak*. A *kulak* has been defined as a peasant who rents land, hires labor, possesses a mill or other "home industry," and engages in trade or usury.¹⁹ Judged by these standards, in 1925-1926 a number of "middle" peasants should frequently have been classified as *kulaks*. In 1925 the "middle" peasants rented 60 per cent of the land, while the *kulaks* rented 30.5 per cent.²⁰ Similarly, 75.5 per cent of the agricultural workers were employed by "middle" peasants, and only 15 per cent by *kulaks*; although, taking seasonal work into consideration, it was estimated that the *kulaks* employed approximately 50 per cent of the available labor.²¹

The *kulaks*, as a group, formed an infinitesimal minority of the population. The taxation figures for 1926 showed that rich peasants at that time constituted 3.3 per cent of the population, "middle" peasants 66.4 per cent, and poor peasants 30.3 per cent.²² A tendency on the part of the more prosperous "middle" peasants to gravitate toward the *kulaks*, however, became apparent during 1927-1928. On the basis of agricultural production it was estimated in 1928 that the "upper group" of peasants, constituting 10 per cent of the agricultural population, furnished some 30 per cent of the total grain production, and 40 per cent of the total marketed grain.²³

The *kulak* could be regarded as rich only when judged by the low economic standards prevailing in the Russian village. As late as 1929 it was calculated that the value of the total means of production of a *kulak* family, including livestock, did not exceed \$700 on an average. In his village, however, the *kulak* was considered a "capitalist." The poor peasants were in debt to him for past favors, and depended on him for work, grain, draft-animals and agricultural machinery. The economic influence which the *kulak* exercised in the village frequently enabled him, prior to 1928, to play the part of political "boss" in the local Soviet, where he used his power to obtain favors for his friends and relatives. In verse and caricature, the *kulak* was pictured as a bloated exploiter, a spider grown fat on the blood of poor peasants. The government frowned on the "capitalistic" tendencies of the *kulak*, which appeared to threaten the eventual control of the State over agriculture, as well as the economic freedom of the poor and "middle" peasants, potential allies of the industrial workers. Aware of the disfavor in which he was generally held, the *kulak* tended to associate with the reactionary elements of the population—village priests and former landed gentry—a fact which made him all the more suspicious to the authorities.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 42-44.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

19. Regulation of Council of People's Commissars, May 21, 1929, *Economicheskaya Zhizn* (Economic Life), May 22, 1929.

20. *K Voprossu o Sozialisticheskoy Pereoustroystve Selskovo Khozyaystva*, cited, p. 42-44.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 60-61.

22. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's Commissariat for Finance, *Selskoe Khozyaystvo S.S.S.R. v 1926-1927 godu* (Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. in 1926-1927), Moscow, State Financial Publishing Board, 1929, p. LXXIX.

23. *Platiletnyi Plan*, cited, Vol II, Part I, p. 271.

SLOW PROGRESS OF "SOCIALIZED" AGRICULTURE

The existence of the *kulaks* was particularly disturbing to the government in view of the slight progress in grain production made by the "socialized" sector during the years which followed the inauguration of the New Economic Policy. Lenin had expressed the opinion that under the New Economic Policy the government should by every means in its power encourage the development of all forms of agricultural co-operation, in order to pave the way for collectivization. The total number of agricultural co-operatives increased after 1920, and by 1925 was double that of 1910.²⁴

It would be impossible, within the scope of this report, to make a detailed study of all the forms of agricultural co-operation which have developed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics since 1921. Attention must therefore be devoted to the collective farms,²⁵ which represent the highest degree of co-operation, and whose organization is of particular interest to the Soviet government. It may be said, in general, that collective farms are organized according to one of three different types: the partnership (*tovaryshchestvo*), the *artel*, or the commune. A partnership is formed for the purpose of raising the productivity of the land of its members by means of joint cultivation, and joint utilization of the machinery and draft-animals in their possession. The partnership secures credits, organizes the marketing of the products of its members, and attempts to furnish them with agronomical information.²⁶ Land, machinery and draft-animals, however, usually remain the individual property of the members. The members of the *artel* pool their land, agricultural machinery and draft-animals, but retain possession of their homes, small livestock and fowls.²⁷ Finally, in the commune, the members pool all their resources, including their homes,

and share all things in common, establishing communal kitchens, dining-rooms, nurseries and laundries.²⁸ The peasants, on the whole, have shown a disinclination to organize communes, and appear to prefer the less advanced types of the *artel* and the partnership.²⁹ In 1927 the average size of a collective farm was 52 hectares, and the total sown area under collective farms was estimated at 820,000 hectares. The official figures for 1927 show that 1,100,000 peasants were then organized in collectives.³⁰

In addition to the collective farms organized by the peasants on the basis of their own resources, there were to be found, in the "socialized" sector, the State farms³¹ which had been established by the government on land seized from the landowners in 1917. The State farms, owned and operated entirely by the State, were from the beginning intended to serve as models of agricultural organization and production, to facilitate transition to communistic agriculture, and to disseminate cultural and agronomical information.³² The productivity of the State farms remained at a low level after 1921, owing to a variety of causes, chief among which was the general disorganization and deterioration of the lands on which they had been formed.

The fact which most disturbed the government in 1927 was that State and collective farms constituted a "mere island in the sea of individual peasant farms," and together furnished only 1.5 per cent of the total grain production, and only 3 per cent of the total marketable grain.³³

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN 1927-1928

Agricultural production, as a whole, had not yet been restored to the pre-war level. In 1927-1928 the total production of grain was estimated at 73,000,000 tons, as com-

24. *K Voprossu o Sozialisticheskom Pereoustroistvye Sel'skovo Khozyastva*, cited, p. 164. In 1910 there were 27,000 agricultural co-operatives in Russia, as compared with 54,813 in 1925.

25. The Russian word for collective farm is *Kolhoz*.

26. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's Commissariat for Agriculture, *Selsko-Khozyastvennaya Kooperatsiya* (Agricultural Co-operation), Collection of decrees, regulations, circulars, etc. regarding questions of agricultural co-operation. Moscow, "The New Village," 1924. Model Charter of the *Tovaryshchestvo*, p. 103.

27. *Ibid.*, Model Charter of the *Artel*, p. 122.

28. *Ibid.*, Model Charter of the Commune, p. 114. On the three types of collective farms, cf. "Reconstruction in Russia: Revolution by Tractor," *The Economist*, January 4, 1930, p. 7.

29. It is estimated that between 1925-1926, in the three regions of the Ural, Siberia and Northern Caucasus, the number of communes fell off from 19.2 per cent of the total number of collective farms to 13.6 per cent, while that of partnerships rose from 43.5 per cent to 54.4 per cent. *K Voprossu o Sozialisticheskom Pereoustroistvye Sel'skovo Khozyastva*, cited, p. 292.

30. Cf. p. 195.

31. The Russian name for State farm is *Sovhoz* (literally, Soviet farm).

32. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's Commissariat for Agriculture, *Sovietskie Khozyastva* (State Farms), Collection of decrees and regulations regarding the organization and activities of State Farms, February 14, 1919-November 7, 1920. Moscow, State Publishing Board, 1924.

33. *Control Figures*, Table 66, p. 554.

pared with 81,000,000 tons in 1913, or 90 per cent of the pre-war figure;³⁴ this decrease was attributed to the disappearance of the large estates of the nobility, gentry and *kulaks*, and the "fractioning" of the land.³⁵ Marketable grain, that is, grain which the peasants offered for sale, over and above their own needs, was estimated at only 8,000,000 tons, as compared with 20,000,000 tons in 1913, or 40 per cent of the pre-war figure.³⁶ The wide divergence between the amount of grain produced and that placed on the market was attributed, on the one hand, to increased consumption by a growing population and, on the other, to the unwillingness of the peasants to sell agricultural products at prices which were far below those of manufactured goods.³⁷

The low productivity of agriculture was accompanied by a decline of exports of agricultural products, especially grain. The following table illustrates the relative value of agricultural exports prior to the war, and following 1921:³⁸

	AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS	GRAIN
	<i>(In rubles at 1913 prices)</i>	
1909-1913	1,343,942,000	676,777,000
1921	16,912,000	64,000
1922	56,771,000	194,000
1923	197,970,000	108,365,000
1924	264,020,000	82,331,000
1925	291,548,000	68,296,000
1926	363,623,000	135,384,000

The decline of agricultural exports made it increasingly difficult for the government to import the machinery and semi-manufactured goods which were needed for the further development of industry.

It may be seen that, during the years which followed the inauguration of the New Economic Policy, agricultural productivity, both within the "private" and the "socialized" sectors, remained at the low level to which it had been reduced by the revolution and the years of "war communism" and that nearly half of the grain produced came from the farms of *kulaks* and

prosperous "middle" peasants who, if not openly hostile to the government, were at least more concerned with their own interests than with those of the State. The government needed grain to satisfy the demands of a growing population whose standard of living was rising gradually, and raw materials for a rapidly expanding industry, to say nothing of a surplus for export. It appeared necessary not only to raise agricultural productivity, but to accomplish it in such a manner as to liberate the government from its dependence on the *kulaks*, while at the same time strengthening the union of poor and "middle" peasants with the industrial workers.

TROTZKY VS. STALIN

The Communist party was divided against itself as to the policy best calculated to offer a solution of the agrarian problem. Trotsky, who following Lenin's death in 1924 had become the leader of the Left wing of the party in opposition to Stalin, its Secretary-General, maintained that the party should organize the poor and "middle" peasants for a concerted drive on the *kulaks*. Trotsky claimed that the *kulaks*, as members of an exploiting class, should be deprived of the franchise. He further advocated a sharply progressive system of taxation; the application of a class policy directed again the *kulaks* in the matter of division and utilization of land; and the establishment of a firm control on the part of local soviets, purged of *kulak* elements, over the regulation of questions pertaining to land. He favored intensive collectivization, to be financed by the State, and the extension of special privileges to collective farms, from which the *kulaks* were to be rigorously excluded.³⁹

Stalin, in reply, contended that the measures advocated by Trotsky would merely serve to foment class war in the villages, and to destroy the "link" which the government was attempting to establish between peasants and workers. He agreed that the *kulaks* were an undesirable element, but maintained that the State was not yet financially and industrially equipped to supplant the production of *kulaks* by that of State and col-

34. G. Krizhanovsky, Chairman of the State Planning Commission (*Gosplan*). Report made at the Fifth All-Union Congress of Soviets, *Izvestia*, May 31, 1929.

35. *K Voprossu o Sozialisticheskoy Pereoustroystve Selskovo Khozyastva*, cited, p. 350.

36. Krizhanovsky, cited.

37. *K Voprossu o Sozialisticheskoy Pereoustroystve Selskovo Khozyastva*, cited, p. 350. The population of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is increasing at the rate of 3,500,000 per year. Cf. Kalinin, *Izvestia*, June 1, 1929.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 343 and 350.

39. For a statement of Trotsky's agrarian program, cf. Leon Trotsky, *The Real Situation in Russia*, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1928, p. 60, et seq.

lective farms. He proposed, on the one hand, to restrict the activities of the *kulaks* by means of taxation and other administrative measures and, on the other hand, to encourage the development of agricultural co-operation.⁴⁰ The Fifteenth Congress of the Communist party, December 1927, condemned the program of the Left Opposition and approved the expulsion of Trotsky from the party, which had taken place in November of that year. At the same time the Con-

gress approved the policy of Stalin, and declared that the fundamental task of the party in the villages was to effect "a gradual transition of scattered peasant farms to the rails of large-scale production" on the basis of agricultural cooperation, while giving all possible encouragement to collective organizations. It reaffirmed the resolution of the Fourteenth Congress of the party, 1925, to the effect that pressure should be applied to *kulak* elements in the villages.⁴¹

STALIN'S AGRARIAN POLICY

AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

The agricultural program of the Five-Year Plan, which was put in operation on October 1, 1928, reflected the conclusions reached by the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist party with regard to the agrarian question. The aim of the program was two-fold: to raise agricultural productivity, and to shift the emphasis in production from the individual to the State and collective farms. For the attainment of these aims the program adopted two basic policies: in the first place, it provided for such a development of the "socialized" sector of agriculture by 1933 as would permit it to produce grain to an amount equalling, if not exceeding, that produced by the "upper group" of peasants in 1928; in the second place, on the assumption that individual peasant farms, during the five-year period and even after, would continue to play an important part in the scheme of national economy, it provided for the improvement of these farms, and for expansion of all forms of agricultural co-operation. The successful fulfilment of the agricultural program was expected not only to provide grain for home consumption and for export, but to free the government from its dependence on the "upper group" of peasants, and guarantee its success in the struggle with the *kulaks*.⁴²

Specifically, in the section devoted to the "socialized" sector, the program provided

for an increase in the area of collective farms from 1,390,000 hectares in 1928 to 21,000,000 by 1933, and an increase in the area of State farms from 1,425,300 hectares in 1928 to 5,000,000 by 1933. The program further called for intensive mechanization of collective farms, the gradual socialization of all their means of production, and the establishment of service stations at which horses, tractors and other machinery could be rented. As a result of these measures, it was expected that by 1933 the "socialized" sector would furnish 39 per cent of all marketable grain—approximately the amount furnished in 1928 by the "upper group" of peasants.

With regard to individual peasant farms, the plan provided for the introduction of modern agricultural machinery, improvement in methods of farming (such as abolition of the "strip" system, rotation in crops, autumn plowing, etc.) and the use of improved seeds and fertilizers. The State undertook to construct two tractor factories during the five-year period, and to expand the production of other agricultural machinery, as well as of mineral fertilizers. At the same time provision was made for the development of agricultural cooperation, and the sale by peasants, grouped in co-operative associations, of grain to the State on "contract," in exchange for machinery and other manufactured goods. The financing of agriculture, according to the plan, would call for a total expenditure of 23 billion rubles during the five-year period, of which over 5 billion rubles were to be supplied by the State. The fulfilment of the plan in both sectors of agriculture was expected to result

40. I. V. Stalin, *Ob Oppozitsii* (Regarding the Opposition), Moscow, State Publishing Board, 1928.

41. Russian Communist Party, *XV S'ezd Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii* (Fifteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party). Stenographic Report, Moscow, State Publishing Board, 1928. The resolution of the Congress with regard to the report of the Central Committee of the party is found on p. 1279.

42. *Piatiletnyi Plan*, cited, p. 270 et seq.

in raising total grain production from 75 million tons in 1928 to over 100 million tons in 1933, and the amount of marketable grain from eight million tons in 1928 to 20 million tons in 1933.⁴³

THE PROGRESS OF COLLECTIVIZATION, 1927-1929

Industry, unlike agriculture, had steadily developed since 1921, with the result that in 1927 the government could obtain from the factories the agricultural machinery necessary to carry out its program of collectivization. The years 1927-1929 witnessed the expansion of existing collective farms, and the organization of new farms. According to

Soviet spokesmen, collectivization assumed the proportions of an "elemental upheaval" in the villages, largely due, in their opinion, to realization on the part of the "middle" peasants of the material advantages offered by collective farming. "The peasants," said Kalinin, president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on January 21, 1930, "have understood that only by means of the collectivization of their small and scattered farms can they obtain an improvement of their well-being and raise their cultural level."⁴⁴ The progress made by collectivization during this period is illustrated by the following table:⁴⁵

	1927	1928	1929
Number of peasant farms embraced by collectives	244,000	445,000	1,040,000
Percentage of collectivization (as compared with total number of peasant farms)		1.8	4.0
Collectivized population	1,100,000	2,000,000	4,680,000
Collectivized sown area (in hectares)	820,000	1,390,000	4,260,000
Number of collective farms	15,670	38,000	61,000
Number of large collectives (2,000 hectares and over)		No information	250
Average size of collective farms (according to sown area, in hectares)	52	50	70

REPRESSION OF THE "KULAKS"

The *kulaks*, realizing that collectivization spelled the end of their power, sought to dissuade poor and "middle" peasants from joining the collectives and, failing that, to hamper collectivization by acts of murder and arson, with the result that "class war" became a common occurrence in the villages. The government, for its part, proceeded with the practical application of the policy enunciated by Stalin, which involved resort to many of the measures recommended by Trotzky: the existence of the *kulaks* was tolerated, but their activities were severely restricted. In 1928 the *kulaks* were deprived of the franchise. The law of December 15, 1928,⁴⁶ regarding the division and utilization of land, discriminated against the *kulaks* in favor, on the one hand, of collective farms, and on the other, of poor and "middle" peasants. Collective farms, poor and "middle" peasants were given preference, in the order named, in the distribution of land, and the apportionment by the government of credits for the purchase of agricul-

tural machinery, seeds and fertilizers. The *kulaks* were excluded from the enjoyment of these privileges.

The single agricultural tax established on February 20, 1929⁴⁷ was intended to deal a further blow to the *kulaks*. It provided for the taxation of individual peasant farms according to a detailed scale based on the computation of various sources of agricultural income. This scale, however, was not applicable to *kulak* farms, each of which was to be taxed individually, to a number not exceeding three per cent of the total number of farms in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.⁴⁸ Poor farms were altogether exempt from taxation, to a number not exceeding 35 per cent of the total number of farms in the country.⁴⁹ It will be seen that while the "middle" peasants were offered material inducements to join the collective

45. State Planning Commission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, *Controlnye Zifry Khozyastva S.S.S.R. na 1929-1930 god* (Control Figures of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. for 1929-1930), Moscow, "Planned Economy," 1930, Table 67, p. 555. Cf. Yakovlev, I. A. *Za Kolhozy* (For Collective Farms), Moscow, State Publishing Board, 1929.

46. *Izvestia*, December 16, 1928.

47. *Ibid.*, February 21, 1929.

48. It will be recalled that in 1925-1926 it had been estimated that the *kulaks* constituted 3.3 per cent of the agricultural population.

49. It will be recalled that in 1925-1926 it had been estimated that poor peasants constituted 30.3 per cent of the agricultural population.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 298.

44. *Izvestia*, January 22, 1930.

farms, they had little incentive to increase the prosperity of their individual farms for fear that they might be classified as *kulaks*, and as such subjected to administrative repression.

THE RIGHT OPPOSITION

The measures adopted by the government to hasten the development of collectivization on the one hand, and to restrict the activities of the *kulaks* on the other, met with criticism on the part of the more moderate elements of the Communist party, which came to be known as the Right Opposition. During the years 1928-1929 the leaders of this group, Rykov,⁵⁰ Bukharin⁵¹ and Tomskey,⁵² expressed the view that the State was not yet prepared to dispense with the grain production of the *kulaks*, or to replace it by the production of State and collective farms. They urged caution in the development of State and collective farms, and advised the government not to interfere with the production of the *kulaks*, whose exploitative tendencies they urged it to combat. The treatment meted out to the *kulaks* by the government was characterized by Rykov in July 1929 as "military-feudal oppression," and the Right Opposition warned the government that the

continuance of its agrarian policy might result in a grain crisis and a state of hostility between the peasants and workers.

At the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist party, November 1928, Stalin attacked the Right Opposition which was inspired, he said, by "petty bourgeois" sentiments. Acceptance of the theses of the Right Opposition, he held, would mean the eventual restoration of capitalism. He denied that the relations between peasants and workers had taken a turn for the worse, and criticized the Right Opposition for advocating a policy of *laissez-faire* with regard to the *kulaks*. He agreed that individual peasants as yet produced six times more marketable grain than State and collective farms put together, but argued that the latter two forms of agricultural organization were politically more desirable from the point of view of the Soviet government. Finally, he proposed to expand the sown area of poor and "middle" farms, and still further to increase the development of State and collective farms.⁵³

As a result of the measures adopted for the expansion of collective farms and the improvement of individual farms, the government could point in the fall of 1929, to the following figures:⁵⁴

	1927	1928	1929
Total sown area (in hectares)	115,029,000	115,733,000	120,376,000
Total production of grain (in centners)	735,800,000	726,700,000	762,500,000
Marketable grain (in centners)	83,300,000	83,300,000	102,200,000
Total sown area of "socialized" sector, State and collective farms (in hectares)	2,053,000	2,815,300	6,078,700
Total grain production of "socialized" sector (in centners)	14,000,000	17,900,000	41,900,000
Percentage of total grain production furnished by "socialized" sector	1.5	1.8	3.8
Percentage of marketable grain furnished by "socialized" sector	3.0	3.6	6.9

50. President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist party.

51. Formerly editor of *Pravda*, the official organ of the Communist party; until November 1929, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist party.

52. Formerly Chairman of the Trade Union Congress; until July 1930 member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist party.

53. Address made on November 19, 1928, *Izvestia*, November 24, 1928. In 1928-1929 fifty-five new State farms were organized on land which had never before been subjected to cultivation. These farms, which are highly mechanized, are usually devoted to a single purpose—cultivation of grain, cattle breeding, etc.—and are operated by various State farm trusts, such as the Grain Trust, Sugar Trust and others. The largest of these new State farms is the "Giant" farm in the Northern Caucasus, which in 1929 occupied an area of 130,000 acres.

54. *Control Figures*, cited, p. 528 et seq. At pre-war prices, agricultural production in 1928-1929 showed an increase of 12.7 per cent over 1913, although the production of grain showed a decrease of 4.8 per cent as compared to pre-war averages for the five years 1909-1913. Boris E. Skvirsky, "A Survey of Soviet Russia's Accomplishments," *Current History*, July 1930, p. 649. Exports of agricultural products, especially grain,

On the basis of these figures Stalin contended that the dark predictions of the Right Opposition had not been realized, and that the "socialized" sector was showing a steady development which justified the government's agrarian policy. Failing to obtain a recantation from the Right Opposition, the Central Committee of the Communist party on November 17, 1929 expelled Bukharin from the Political Bureau of the party, and warned Rykov and Tomsky that a similar fate awaited them if they persisted in the Right "heresy." On November 25, 1929 Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky recanted;⁵⁵ this act on their part was welcomed by the Soviet press as a sign that the "monolithic" unity of the party had been maintained.

LIQUIDATION OF THE "KULAKS"

Stalin was now free to carry his agrarian policy to its logical conclusion. On December 27, 1929, in an address delivered at the conference of Marxist agrarians, he announced that the results of the past two years, both as concerned the progress of collectivization and the repression of the *kulaks*, permitted the government to pass from "a policy of limitation of the exploitative tendencies of *kulakism*" to "a policy of the liquidation of the *kulaks* as a class." The increase in the grain production of State and collective farms, he claimed, "offered a sufficient material foundation to allow the government to strike at the *kulaks*, to break their opposition, to liquidate them as a class, and to substitute the production of State and collective farms for that of the *kulaks*." Stalin expressed the opinion that the New Economic Policy was useful only so long as it served the purposes of socialism: "but when it ceases to serve the purposes of socialism, we shall cast it to the devil." He emphasized the fact that the only desirable union between peasants and workers is one which will assure the triumph of socialism.⁵⁶

In accordance with the policy expressed by Stalin, the Central Committee of the Com-

munist party on January 6, 1930 issued a decree "concerning the pace of collectivization and the assistance to be rendered by the State to collective farms."⁵⁷ This decree stated that the government expected, in the spring of 1930, to increase the area of collective farms to 30 million hectares, surpassing the estimates of the Five-Year Plan for 1933, and that, as a result, it felt fully justified in passing from "the policy of limitation of the exploitative tendencies of *kulakism* to the policy of the liquidation of the *kulaks* as a class." Provision was made for expansion in the construction of factories manufacturing tractors, combines and other agricultural machinery; for the utilization of existing machinery and draft animals; for the intensive training of agricultural experts; and for an increase in the sum allotted by the State to the collective sector from 270 million to 500 million rubles. Finally, the People's Commissariat for Agriculture was entrusted with the preparation of a model charter for collective farms, from which the *kulaks* were to be excluded.

The local authorities,⁵⁸ instructed by the government to regard the "liquidation" of the *kulaks* as a component part of the process of collectivization, proceeded, with the aid of "shock brigades" of workers sent from the urban centres, to collectivize the farms within their respective districts. Collectivization was accompanied by an intensification of "class war" in the villages, which was essentially a struggle for the support of the "middle" peasants, between the local authorities, the agricultural workers and the poor peasants, on the one hand, and the *kulaks* on the other. The land and means of production of the *kulaks* were confiscated; the *kulaks* were deprived of the right to rent land; they were barred from entering the newly-formed collective farms into which their property had been absorbed and, to all intents and purposes, were placed outside the law.⁵⁹ The *kulaks*, enraged by these measures, killed their cattle rather than let

declined as shown by the following figures (*Economic Review of the Soviet Union*, January 1, 1930, p. 13):

	1927-1928	1928-1929	Per Cent Change
	(In rubles)		
Total agricultural exports	383,215,000	371,027,000	— 3.2
Grain	38,942,000	18,878,000	—51.5

It should be noted that as a result of unfavorable weather conditions, both 1927-1928 and 1928-1929 were years of bad harvests.

55. *Izvestia*, November 26, 1929.

56. *Ibid.*, December 29, 1929.

57. *Ibid.*, January 7, 1930.

58. The organs of authority in the villages are the village soviet, elected at an electoral assembly in which only persons possessing the franchise may participate, and the local Communist party organization. The local party organization is charged with directing the activities of the corresponding village soviet by means of so-called "party fractions," or Communist members of the village soviet. Cf. Constitution of the Communist Party of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, adopted at the Fourteenth Congress of the party, December 1925. W. R. Batsell, *Soviet Rule in Russia*, New York, Macmillan, 1929, p. 735.

it fall into the hands of the authorities, murdered Soviet officials, and set fire to Soviet granaries and buildings. The government made no suggestion as to the eventual disposal of the *kulaks*, except that they be exiled to distant regions of Siberia and Northern Russia, there to be employed in lumber camps.^{59a} Soviet spokesmen, while deploring the hardships which "liquidation" inflicted on individual *kulaks*, justified it as a "prophylactic measure" and an "anti-capitalistic inoculation."⁶⁰

STALIN HALTS COLLECTIVIZATION

On March 1, 1930, on the basis of reports from the local authorities which were vying with each other for a hundred per cent fulfilment of the plan of collectivization within the shortest possible time, it was estimated that 55 per cent of all peasant farms had been collectivized.⁶¹ It soon became apparent, however, that these figures did not everywhere correspond to facts. In many regions collectivization had taken place "on paper" only, without prior consultation of any but the poor peasants, who possessed few assets, and could not establish collective farms without the aid of their more prosperous neighbors. On many occasions, especially in remote regions of the country, economic and even military pressure had been brought to bear on poor and "middle" peasants who had shown themselves reluctant to enter the collectives. The zeal of the local authorities had frequently led them to close all markets within their jurisdiction, thus preventing the sale of agricultural products by the peasants. Furthermore, anti-religious propaganda had been often injected into the drive for collectivization, with the result that churches had been closed or dismantled against the wishes of the population. Reports from the villages showed that these measures had antagonized not only the *kulaks*, against whom they were specifically directed, but also the more prosperous

"middle" peasants, described as "sub-*kulaks*."

Stalin, aware that hostility on the part of the "middle" peasants threatened not only collectivization, but also the formation of the famous "link" between peasants and workers, on which the equilibrium of economic and political forces within the State is made to depend, immediately took drastic measures to restrain the zeal of the local authorities. In an article published on March 2, 1930,⁶² he warned his followers that they were suffering from "dizziness from success" and by their extreme policy were simply playing into the hands of enemies of the Soviet government. He decried the formation of "paper collectives" in regions unprepared for collectivization, especially when accompanied by threats of military force or economic boycott. He assured the peasants that the practicable form of collective organization, for the present, at least, was to be found, not in the commune, but in the *artel*. Finally, he announced that the task of the party consisted in the consolidation of successes already attained, and their utilization for further progress.

In a set of ten answers given on April 3, 1930 to "comrades-collectivists" at the direction of the Central Committee of the Communist party, Stalin analyzed in detail the mistakes which overzealous Communists had committed in the villages.⁶³ He stated that the fundamental error had consisted in the use of repressive measures against the "middle" peasants, who all too frequently had been identified with the *kulaks*. "Repression," said Stalin, "necessary and useful in the struggle with our class enemies, is dangerous and not permissible with respect to the 'middle' peasant, who is our ally." The local authorities, he claimed, had disregarded Lenin's injunction that the formation of collectives, to be permanent, must be voluntary, and had attempted to force collectivization on the peasants, achieving temporary successes on paper, but actually obtaining negative results. In their haste to complete collectivization, they had on many occasions tried to skip the transitional stage of the

59. The measures taken against the *kulaks* were particularly severe in regions where an attempt was made to effect "complete" collectivization, as provided by a decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, February 2, 1930. *Izvestia*, February 2, 1930.

59a. Cf. address made by Yakovlev, People's Commissar for Agriculture, to Moscow workers departing for work on collective farms, *Izvestia*, January 24, 1930.

60. Cf. address made by Kalinin, president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, *Izvestia*, March 3, 1930.

61. *Izvestia*, March 14, 1930.

62. "Golovokruzhenie ot Uspechov" (Dizziness from Success), *Izvestia*, March 2, 1930.

63. *Izvestia*, April 3, 1930.

artel, and had established communes by means of decrees, without the necessary preparation. The government, said Stalin, had no intention of abandoning the struggle with the *kulaks*: far from effecting a retreat, it was simply pausing to consolidate its position in the villages. He warned the peasants who had begun to withdraw from the collectives after the publication of his article on "dizziness from success" that they were acting against their own interests, for "only the collective farms give the peasants an opportunity to emerge from poverty and darkness." The peasants who withdrew from the collectives, he said, would not share the privileges that the government was extending to collective farms.

Notwithstanding rumors that the party was divided with regard to agrarian policy, and that Stalin was encountering opposition both from the Left and from the Right, the Central Committee of the party published on March 15, 1930 a decree which closely followed Stalin's analysis of the situation in the villages.^{63a} This decree, directed against "deviations from the party line in the collective movement," issued a series of instructions to local party organizations. The latter were ordered immediately to desist from all measures directed at the establishment of collectives by means of force; to prevent transition from the *artel* to the commune without prior official approval; to prevent the forced socialization of homes, livestock, and fowls; to revise the lists of persons who had been deprived of land and of electoral rights; to prohibit the closing of markets, and not hamper the sale by peasants, including members of the collectives, of their products in the open market; to cease the arbitrary closing of churches, and not permit churches to be closed without express demand on the part of a majority of the local population; finally, to remove and replace by others all officials and party workers unable or unwilling to carry on a decisive struggle against infractions of the party line in the villages.

MODEL CHARTER OF THE ARTEL

The government had already taken steps, on March 2, 1930, to provide a framework

for the organization of collective farms, by approving the model charter prepared by the People's Commissariat for Agriculture in accordance with the decree of the Central Committee of the Communist party, January 6, 1930.⁶⁴ The charter provides that an *artel* is formed when a number of peasants voluntarily unite, in order, "by combining means of production and labor, to establish a large collective farm, and thus to guarantee a real and final victory over the *kulak*, over all exploiters and enemies of the workers, over need and ignorance, and over the backwardness of the small individual farm, and to create a high productivity of labor and establish a marketable surplus." Land, agricultural machinery, all draft-animals, seed reserves and farm buildings necessary for the operation of the *artel*, are socialized. The dwellings of members of the *artel*, however, are not socialized. Likewise, sheep, swine, fowls, and agricultural implements necessary for work in orchards and gardens may be retained by the members for individual use.

Any member of the working population who has reached the age of sixteen is eligible for membership in the *artel*. *Kulaks* or other disfranchised persons (this would include priests, the former bourgeoisie and gentry) may not become members of the *artel*; exception is made only for members of families in which there are persons of known loyalty to the State—Red soldiers and sailors, and village teachers. On entering the *artel*, each member must pay an entrance fee in cash—from two to ten per cent of the value of his property, both socialized and non-socialized. This fee may be recovered when the member leaves the *artel*; land, however, cannot be so recovered. Those leaving the *artel* may procure land only from unoccupied land at the disposal of the State. From one-quarter to one-half of the value of the socialized property of the members of the *artel* is placed in an indivisible fund, which is to be used for the improvement and enlargement of the collective.

The affairs of the *artel* are administered by general meetings of the members, and by an executive board elected for one year. The executive board apportions work among the

63a. *Ibid.*, March 15, 1930.

64. *Ibid.*, March 2, 1930. The English text of this charter has been published in the *Economic Review of the Soviet Union*, April 1, 1930, p. 124.

several members of the *artel*, in connection with both management and production. In the course of the year, the members of the *artel* are to receive an advance of their wages (in kind or cash), the amount of the advance not to exceed 50 per cent of the amount due them for labor. Final settlement of wages is to be made at the end of the fiscal year.

The model charter provides that each *artel* is to become a member of the association of collective farms and is to deliver its marketable produce to the State and to the co-operatives; in return, the State and the co-operatives are to furnish the *artel* with means of production, such as tractors and other agricultural machinery, and manufactured goods; to extend credits to the *artel*; and to furnish it with technical assistance.

With a view to encouraging the expansion of collective farms, the government extended to them a number of privileges. The single agricultural tax law of February 23, 1930 abolishes the principle of progressive taxation with regard to collective farms, and draws a distinction between various types of collectives, communes being taxed at a lower rate than other collective farms.⁶⁵ On April 2, 1930 the government decreed the exemption from the single agricultural tax for two years (1930-1932) of all socialized draft-animals, and of all livestock and fowls, whether socialized or remaining in the individual possession of members of the collectives.⁶⁶

While conferring special privileges on collective farms, the government did not overlook the fact that individual peasant farms could not as yet be dispensed with. The single agricultural tax law of February 25, 1930 provided that no taxes would be levied on land sown in excess of the area of the previous year. Should a peasant, however, decrease the sown area without satisfactory reasons, he would be obliged to pay a tax on a sown area equal to that of the previous year, and the land he had failed to sow would be turned over to collectives, to be sown for their own benefit.

65. *Ibid.*, February 25, 1930; cf. "The New Single Agricultural Tax Law," *Economic Review of the Soviet Union*, June 15, 1930, p. 249.

66. *Izvestia*, April 5, 1930. This decree applies fully only to *artels*, communes and such partnerships for the joint cultivation of land in which draft-animals and implements are socialized: decree of April 12, 1930, *ibid.*, April 12, 1930.

The tendency shown by individual peasant farms during March and early April to lag in the fulfilment of the spring sowing, especially in regions where they had been forced to join the collectives, and had later withdrawn, caused the government to re-affirm the provisions of the tax law on April 12, 1930, and to direct the collective farms to assist poor individual farms once they had completed their own work.⁶⁷

THE POSITION OF VILLAGE SOVIETS

The government called on the village soviets to take an active part both in the collectivization movement and the "liquidation" of the *kulaks*. In order to play effectively the part assigned to them by the government, the village soviets had to be thoroughly reconstructed, with a view to the exclusion of *kulak* elements, and the establishment of broader representation for agricultural workers, poor and "middle" peasants.⁶⁸ On January 25, 1930 the government issued a decree regarding the new tasks of the village soviets.⁶⁹ According to this decree, village soviets should assist collective farms in the preparation and fulfilment of their plans of production; control fulfilment by collective farms of their various obligations to the State, such as the delivery of grain under "contract" and the payment of taxes; combat *kulaks* and prevent them from entering the collective farms or influencing their work; direct educational and social institutions in the village, and in all possible ways further the Socialist education of the masses.⁷⁰

It has already been pointed out that, in an excess of zeal, the local soviets early in 1930 frequently deprived "middle" peasants of the franchise, identifying them with *kulaks*. The government attempted to correct these errors by the decree of March 15, 1930, which provides for a revision of the lists of persons deprived of the franchise, and immediate rectification of errors

67. *Ibid.*, April 13, 1930.

68. Kalinin, Address at All-Union Congress on Questions of Soviet Construction, *Ibid.*, January 22, 1930; Molotov, Address at Central Committee of Communist party, January 13, 1930, *Ibid.*, January 21, 1930. It is frequently pointed out that, while 35 per cent of the agricultural population are exempt from the agricultural tax, only 32 per cent were elected to the village soviets as a result of the last elections held in 1929.

69. *Izvestia*, January 26, 1930.

70. Cf. also decree of February 3, 1930, *ibid.*, March 7, 1930.

committed with respect to "middle" peasants, village teachers, Red soldiers and sailors.

RESULTS OF THE SPRING SOWING

The various measures taken by the government to encourage agricultural production in both the "socialized" and "private" sectors resulted, by June 25, 1930, in a 96 per cent fulfilment of the plan for spring sowing. The total area sown to grain and industrial crops was estimated at 89,595,000 hectares, of which 2,934,000 were occupied by State, 33,045,000 by collective and 48,673,000 by individual farms.⁷¹ On the basis of these figures, Stalin, at the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist party, June 29, 1930 declared that in two years, despite the pessimistic warnings of the Right Opposition, collective farms have surpassed the estimates of the Five-Year Plan for 1933. During the current year, he said, 2 million tons of marketable grain will be furnished by State farms, 8 million tons by collective farms, and 6 million tons by

individual farms, and a surplus of from 2 to 4 million tons will be available for export. Yakovlev, People's Commissar for Agriculture, contrasted the situation in 1930, when a large portion of marketable grain is expected to come from State and collective farms, with that in 1927, when individual peasants, *kulaks* and prosperous "middle" peasants, controlled a major portion of the grain offered for sale. In agriculture, he said, as in industry, the "socialistic" system is now driving out the "capitalistic" system. Henceforth, the peasants will fall into two main groups: members of the collective farms, who "are the real and stable support of Soviet rule," and those poor and "middle" peasants who are not yet willing to enter the collective farms, "but whom the mass experience of the collectives will undoubtedly persuade in a relatively short time of the necessity of setting out on the road of collectivization." Yakovlev warned the party organizations, however, against the tendency to ignore individual peasant farms, "which in a number of regions of the country will continue to exist for some time to come."⁷²

THE PROBLEMS OF COLLECTIVE FARMING

The formation of collective farms on the general lines laid down in the model charter approved on March 2, 1930, raises a number of problems with regard both to the relations of peasants within the *artel*, and the relations of the *artel* with the State and the co-operatives. The social composition of the *artel* is a matter of the first importance. An *artel* composed only of poor peasants has small chance of success, since the poor peasants possess little land and few means of production. The "middle" peasants, when entering an *artel*, are from the start called on to contribute more in land, machinery, draft-animals and entrance fees than the poor peasants. The advantages of collective farming are therefore more obvious to the poor peasants, who see in it an opportunity to profit by the resources of their prosperous neighbors, than to the "middle" peasants, who

already enjoy a relatively comfortable economic position. It has been observed, as a result, that the "middle" peasants look at collectivization more critically than the poor peasants, and are apt to ask themselves what benefits they will derive from it.⁷³

DISTRIBUTION OF WAGES

The method of distributing wages within the *artel* is of paramount interest to the members. The government is of the opinion that Communistic distribution of wages on the principle of "to each according to his need" is at present Utopian, and cannot be realized as long as labor remains a disagreeable necessity. A decree of April 13, 1930 therefore provides that the share of the earnings of each member of the *artel* is to be determined according to the quality and quantity of his work. Such a system presupposes the existence of an accurate method of grading the work carried on in the collectives. In certain regions, a

71. At the present time, about 25 per cent of the peasant farms are organized in collectives. The percentage of withdrawals has been lowest in the grain-producing regions of the south and the southeast.

72. Theses of the report presented by Yakovlev to the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist party, approved by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party on May 18, 1930. *Izvestia*, May 19, 1930.

73. W. H. Chamberlin, special article, *Christian Science Monitor*, March 25, 1930.

schedule of remuneration for specified forms of labor has already been introduced. Some collective farms, however, pay no wages for considerable periods of time, merely carrying the amounts due to members on the books of the farm. The peasants have expressed dissatisfaction with an arrangement which does not assure them a certain amount of cash for the satisfaction of their personal needs.⁷⁴ It will be interesting to see whether the "middle" peasants may not go further and demand a return proportional, not to the quality and quantity of their work, but to the assets which they originally contributed to the collective farm.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The organization of work on a collective farm constitutes a fundamental problem, on the correct solution of which the material success of the farm will eventually depend. The executive board of each *artel* is faced with the task of planning the work of the *artel* over a period of one year, at least, with a view to obtaining the greatest possible degree of efficiency from each member in the performance of the task for which he is particularly adapted by training or experience. The proposed industrialization of agriculture is based on the assumption that a collective farm may, to a certain extent, be modeled on an urban factory. If the industrialization of agriculture is to be achieved, the differentiation of functions and specialization of labor which characterize urban factories must be developed on collective farms. The individual farmer, unlike the industrial worker, is a jack-of-all-trades, who at different seasons of the year takes a hand at a variety of agricultural tasks. To perpetuate individual methods of farming in the *artel* would be to defeat the purpose for which it is established. On the other hand, the distribution of tasks among the several members at different seasons of the year calls for executive ability and vision on the part of those charged with the management of the *artel*. It is not to be expected that peasants accustomed to plan and produce individually can be trained overnight to par-

ticipate smoothly in the more complex system of collective farming. Furthermore, slackness and lack of initiative, which go unchecked on the individual farm, must on a collective farm be corrected by the application of labor discipline.⁷⁵

LACK OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS

The quality of the men elected to the management of collective farms may be expected in large part to influence their development. The Soviet government expects that the more enterprising peasants who, as individual farmers, would have risen to the level of "capitalistic" producers, will on collective farms turn their talents to problems of organization and management.⁷⁶ In the meantime, however, the introduction of modern agricultural methods and machinery on collective farms calls for a corps of agricultural experts capable of training the peasants in the ways of modern agriculture, and of assisting the executive board of each farm in solving the technical problems which arise as a result of collectivization. The People's Commissariat for Agriculture estimates that 79,000 highly qualified agricultural experts and 367,000 experts of average qualification will be required by 1933.⁷⁷

The mechanization of collective farms, on which the successful development of collective farming must ultimately depend, creates a growing demand for machinery. A tractor factory with an estimated annual output of 50,000 tractors was completed at Stalingrad in June 1930; similar factories are under construction at Cheliabinsk and Kharkov. The expansion of the tractor division of the Putilov plant is expected to result in an annual output of 30,000 tractors by 1932-1933.⁷⁸ In addition, the Soviet government in 1928-1929 purchased agricultural machinery and tractors abroad to the value of 43,478,000 rubles, orders to the value of \$27,267,629 being placed in the United States.⁷⁹ The government further

75. Kaminskaya, cited.

76. Cf. Address by Kallin, *Izvestia*, March 3, 1930; Theses of report of Yakovlev, People's Commissar of Agriculture, prepared for the Sixteenth Party Congress. *Ibid.*, May 19, 1930.

77. *Ibid.*, May 16, 1930.

78. A. M. Roze, "The Agricultural Machinery Industry," *Economic Review of the Soviet Union*, May 1, 1930, p. 180.

79. *Ibid.*; Saul G. Bron, *Soviet Economic Development and American Business*, New York, Liveright, 1930, p. 136.

74. Kaminskaya, "Organizatsia Truda v Kolhozach" (Organization of Labor on Collective Farms), *Izvestia*, March 27, 1930.

plans to increase the number of inter-village horse and tractor stations intended to serve as centres for the renting of agricultural machinery and draft-animals to collective and individual farms. It is estimated that by February 10, 1930, a total of 1,500 such stations had been organized.⁸⁰ These stations are expected not only to hasten the mechanization of collective farms, but to facilitate the collectivization of the individual farms which resort to their assistance.⁸¹

The government plans to extend financial assistance to agriculture in the future, as

it has done in the past, in the form of both capital investments and credits. It is expected, however, that the share of the State in the financing of agriculture will gradually decrease, as a result, on the one hand, of an increase in the amount assigned by local budgets for the development of agriculture and, on the other hand, of an increase in the resources of collective farms. The following table illustrates the various sources from which the money expended on agriculture is drawn, and their percentage of the total cost of agriculture.⁸²

	1928-1929 (in rubles)	Per Cent	Control Figures for 1929-1930 (in rubles)	Per Cent
Resources of individual peasant farms.....	336,000,000	10.6
Resources of collective farms, co-operatives and other agricultural organizations	662,000,000	36.6	572,000,000	18.1
Resources of other institutions and organizations	459,000,000	14.5
Local budget	128,000,000	7.1	168,000,000	5.3
Resources of system of agricultural credit	283,000,000	15.7	513,000,000	16.2
Interest on debts to State Bank for production credits	47,000,000	2.6	32,000,000	1.0
Credits of other credit institutions	12,000,000	0.4
Credits of State Bank for "contractation"	254,000,000	14.1	275,000,000	8.7
Extension of credits of People's Commissariat for Finance	53,000,000	1.7
Estimates of People's Commissariat for Agriculture	86,000,000	4.8	124,000,000	4.0
State Budget				
Fund for financing of agriculture	331,000,000	18.3	570,000,000	18.0
Fund for trade and electrification	14,000,000	0.8	48,000,000	1.5
Total cost of planned undertakings	1,805,000,000		3,162,000,000	

The distribution of capital investments and credits among the various types of agri-

cultural organizations is illustrated by the following table:⁸³

	1928-1929 (in rubles)	Control Figures for 1929-1930 (in rubles)
State farms (without the Grain Trust)	79,000,000	195,000,000
Grain Trust	70,000,000	170,000,000
Machine-tractor stations	30,000,000
Economic Producing Organizations	14,000,000	46,000,000
Collective farms	139,000,000	348,000,000
State projects (People's Commissariat for Agriculture, etc.)	85,000,000	120,000,000
Co-operation (without collective farms)	206,000,000	328,000,000
Individual peasant farms	384,000,000	343,000,000
Unassigned	53,000,000	56,000,000
Total	1,030,000,000	1,636,000,000

80. *Economic Review of the Soviet Union*, March 1, 1930, p. 93.

81. *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* (Economic Life), September 10, 1929.

82. *Control Figures*, cited, p. 545.

83. *Control Figures*, cited, p. 546.

CONTRACTATION

The Soviet government has during the past two years developed the practice of concluding "contracts" with both collective and individual farms whereby, in return for credits advanced by the State and means of production supplied by it through the co-operatives, the farms undertake to deliver their produce to the State. In 1928-1929 the government "contracted" for grain over an area of 19 million hectares, and it is estimated that in 1929-1930 the "contracted" area will constitute 44 million hectares.⁸⁴ After the harvest, the collective and individual farms which have concluded "contracts" with the State are to deliver the grain "contracted" for to the grain co-operatives, which turn it over to the State agency for the storing and milling of grain (*Soyuzkhleb*); flour and bread are then distributed to the population through the agency of consumers' co-operatives. The system of "contractation" not only makes it possible for the government to control a specified quantity of grain and raw materials at the end of the harvest, thus facilitating the application of "planned economy" to agriculture, but is also expected to encourage the formation by individual peasants of co-operative organizations for the delivery of their produce to the State, thus giving a fresh impetus to collectivization.

A comparison of the records of collective and individual peasant farms within the same region has shown that the former, as a result of planning, the use of machinery and modern agricultural methods, are capable of achieving a higher level of productivity than the latter. It remains to be seen, however, whether the members of collective farms will have the same incentive to increase production beyond the minimum necessary for their own needs and the fulfilment of their "contracts" with the State that they might have if they were working for personal profit. The Soviet spokesmen hope that, eventually, devotion to the interests of the State will furnish to the peasants, as it generally has to the industrial workers, the incentive once derived from personal motives. In the meantime, however, it is argued that material inducements in the form of preference in the distribution of manufactured goods and prizes for prompt fulfilment of "contracts" must be offered to collective farms, for the purpose of encouraging them to increase both the total and the marketable quantity of grain and industrial crops.⁸⁵ In order to meet the growing demand of collective farms for manufactured goods, the government must, in turn, take measures to increase the productivity of industry, and to reduce, as far as possible, the existing divergence between the prices of agricultural and manufactured goods.

CONCLUSION

It may be seen, from the foregoing analysis, that the Soviet government, by the establishment of large-scale farms and the introduction of factory methods and machinery on these farms, is effecting an agrarian revolution which in scope and estimated results is comparable to the great Industrial Revolution.⁸⁶ The economic and political consequences of the transformation which is taking place today in the Russian villages cannot as yet be appraised with any degree of certainty. Time

alone will reveal whether the peasants, organized in collectives, will be induced to furnish grain in sufficient quantities both for home consumption and for export, and will collaborate with the industrial workers in maintaining the "dictatorship" established by the latter; or whether these peasants, failing to receive the proper incentive in the form of material advantages, will attempt to take power into their own hands, and set up an agrarian government devoted to the furtherance of their own interests.

It is likewise too early to predict the effect which this agrarian revolution may eventually have on international relations. The agrarian depression which now pre-

84. *Ibid.*, p. 135.

85. I. Vareikis, "Ob Ustanovlenii Pravilnykh Tovarnykh Otnoshenii s Kolhozami i Merach Povyscheniya Tovarnoi Produktii Kolhozov" (Regarding the Establishment of Correct Trade Relations with Collective Farms and Measures for Raising the Marketable Production of Collective Farms), *Izvestia*, March 7, 1930.

86. W. H. Chamberlin, *Soviet Russia*, cited, p. 206.

vails in Europe and the United States, owing to over-production of grain and a consequent decline in world prices, has at present no counterpart in Russia where, as has been pointed out, the internal demand for grain is still ahead of the supply, and prices are subject to regulation by the government. Increased production of grain in Russia, however, is intended by the government to furnish a surplus for export.

Should world agrarian conditions remain unchanged, the Soviet government may find it difficult to export grain, even if it makes use of its monopoly of foreign trade to dispose of grain by the process of "dumping." Failure to export grain would in turn hamper the import of machinery and semi-manufactured goods, and might delay, if not jeopardize, the further progress of industry.

APPENDIX

BASIC INDEXES OF AGRICULTURE UNDER THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN⁸⁷

	1927-1928	Per Cent of Total	1932-1933	Per Cent of Total	1933-1934
Agricultural population	123,400,000	134,500,000	136,800,000
a. Individual farms	122,000,000	98.9	120,500,000	89.6	116,900,000
b. Collective farms	1,050,000	0.9	12,900,000	9.6	18,600,000
c. State farms	300,000	0.2	1,100,000	0.8	1,300,000
Total Sown Area (in hectares)	115,600,000	141,300,000	146,100,000
a. Individual farms	113,300,000	98.0	122,700,000	85.7	120,500,000
b. Collective farms	1,100,000	0.9	14,500,000	10.2	20,600,000
c. State farms	1,200,000	1.1	4,400,000	3.1	5,000,000
Total Area Sown to Grain (in hectares)	97,400,000	111,400,000	113,000,000
a. Individual farms	95,600,000	98.0	97,700,000	87.7	94,200,000
b. Collective farms	860,000	0.9	10,600,000	9.2	15,000,000
c. State farms	950,000	1.1	3,400,000	3.1	3,800,000
Total production of Grain (in centners)	731,200,000	1,057,800,000	1,164,000,000
a. Individual farms	715,300,000	97.9	895,800,000	84.7	919,200,000
b. Collective farms	7,200,000	1.0	119,500,000	11.8	190,500,000
c. State farms	8,700,000	1.1	43,500,000	4.0	54,300,000
Marketable Grain (in centners)	81,600,000	196,100,000
a. Individual farms	75,600,000	92.5	112,500,000	57.4
b. Collective farms	3,000,000	3.7	49,600,000	25.3
c. State farms	3,000,000	3.8	34,000,000	17.3

87. *Piatiletii Plan*, cited, Tables 1 and 2, p. 332-337. This table is given as an historical document only: it may be expected that, in view of the development of agriculture which

has taken place since the inauguration of the Five-Year Plan, the figures for 1932-1933 and 1933-1934 will undergo considerable revision in the near future.

